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Abstract
Adversarial examples are a type of attack on machine learning (ML) systems
which cause misclassification of inputs. Achieving robustness against adversar-
ial examples is crucial to apply ML in the real world. While most prior work on
adversarial examples is empirical, a recent line of work establishes fundamental
limitations of robust classification based on cryptographic hardness. Most positive
and negative results in this field however assume that there is a fixed target met-
ric which constrains the adversary, and we argue that this is often an unrealistic
assumption. In this work we study the limitations of robust classification if the tar-
get metric is uncertain. Concretely, we construct a classification problem, which
admits robust classification by a small classifier if the target metric is known at
the time the model is trained, but for which robust classification is impossible for
small classifiers if the target metric is chosen after the fact. In the process, we
explore a novel connection between hardness of robust classification and bounded
storage model cryptography.
1 Introduction
A recent line of works [3, 38, 1, 8, 9, 10, 30, 32, 33, 34, 40, 45, 46] studies a class of attacks
on machine learning systems commonly known as adversarial examples or evasion attacks. Such
attacks target a classifierC trained on problemΠ. Assume for simplicity thatΠ has just two classes,
0 and 1. When running an evasion attack A, take a sample x, say of class 0, and apply a small
perturbation to x yielding the adversarial example x˜. The attack succeeds againstC ifC determines
x˜ to be in class 1. In this case, we say A has fooledC. On the other hand, we say that C robustly
classifies the problemΠ if any such evasion attackA foolsC only with small probability.
Choosing Metrics for Adversarial Examples However, a critical aspect in modeling evasion at-
tacks is how to define small perturbations—for classification tasks that involve data one might re-
quire that a small perturbation should not be noticeable to a human observer. Making such a require-
ment formal can be somewhat tricky. We cannot allow the evasion adversary to perturb instances
arbitrarily: If the adversary is allowed to replace instances of class c with a well-formed instance of
another class c′, then any good classifier has to determine as class c′, and therefore robust classifi-
cation becomes an ill-defined task. Thus, we actually need to constrain the adversary. Motivated
by practical considerations, the go-to way of constraining the adversary is by defining a metric ∆
on the instance-space and assigning the adversary a perturbation budget in this metric. For the ex-
ample of image-classification, this metric may be something like the euclidean metric on vectors
representing the images. However, note that there is something arbitrary about fixing a metric such
as the euclidean metric, as it is not clear that this metric captures all perceptible changes. Indeed un-
derstanding human perception [25] and defining aligned metrics [50, 53] are still an open research
questions. Possibly also related to this question, there is an ongoing arms-race when it comes to
defend adversarial examples [1, 8, 30, 45, 46].
Preprint. Under review.
General Impossibility of Robust Classification This motivates the question whether efficient
robust classification is possible for any classification task and any reasonable metric, or whether
there are problems for which efficient robust classification is impossible in principle. Several recent
works [4, 15, 36] have demonstrated that under somemild cryptographic assumptions the latter is the
case: there is no silver bullet against evasion attacks. The problems constructed by these works can
be outlined as follows. Take an unlearnable problem Π with classes 0 and 1 and an instance space
X ⊆ {0, 1}n. Such problems can for example be constructed from pseudorandom functions [26].
As target metric consider the standard hamming metric. Now define an error correcting codeECC :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is efficiently encodable and decodable and can correct a few bit-errors in
the hamming metric. Consider the following problem Π′: Instances x′ for class c ∈ {0, 1} are
obtained by generating an instance x for class c of problem Π and setting x′ = (ECC(x), c). That
is, x′ consists of an error correcting encoding of x, and the last bit of x is identical to the class c.
Non-robust classification of Π′ is easy: A non-robust classifier can decide solely on the bit c, which
is included in the instance x′. On the other hand, we can show that efficient robust classification
of Π′ is impossible. Consider an evasion adversary which just flips the last bit of x′, i.e. the bit
which signals the class of the instance. Call the perturbed instance x˜′ and note that ∆(x′, x˜′) = 1,
i.e. their distance is 1 (and therefore small) in the hamming metric. Unlike the non-robust classifier
a robust classifier cannot rely on the last bit of x˜′ to classify the instance, but needs to resort to
ECC(x) to classify the instance. Consequently, it can be shown that an efficient robust classifier
for Π′ immediately yields an efficient classifier for Π, which however contradicts the unlearnability
of Π. We can conclude that there exists no efficient robust classifier for Π′. On the other hand, note
that robust classification of Π′ is well-defined as there exists an inefficient robust classifier, which
decodesECC(x) and classifies based on x.
Robust Classification via Randomized Smoothing On the other hand, many natural classifica-
tion tasks are robust against a moderate amount of random noise [42]. Recently, [10] demonstrated
that robustness against random noise can be leveraged to achieve a certain amount of provable ro-
bustness against adversarial perturbations. The idea of this approach is to add additional random
noise on a given sample before classification. Given that the amount of random noise is sufficiently
large, any adversarial perturbation is smoothed out by the random noise term. Follow up work
has extended this approach to more noise distributions [33, 34], to community detection tasks in
graphs [32], and empirically improved the observed bounds via adversarial training [40]. Thus,
while on the one side we know that there exists problems which in principle do not admit robust
classification, a fairly natural class of problems can be robustly classified, namely problems which
admit noise-tolerant classification in the same metric.
The Choice of the Metric All of the above works establishing both positive and negative results
have one aspect in common: The metric which constrains the perturbation adversary is both fixed
and publicly know. However, in practice, the exact metric which characterizes the adversary’s bud-
get is not precisely known. As an example consider again perturbations of images which that are
undetectable for a human observer. Such a perturbation might consist of modifying a few pixels
locally, but also shifting the image by a small amount or rotating it slightly. Consequently, there
is no single metric which captures this kind of perturbation exactly. Leaving aside the question if
the correct metric can be characterized or if it will be known at training time, we need to account
for uncertainty in the choice of the target metric. Several recent works have demonstrated that this
is not just a hypothetical concern. Sharma and Chen [45] for example demonstrated that changing
the metric of a defense will break it. In general, extending an attack to a new metric is relatively
straight-forward [48, 51, 52]. This motivates the following question:
What are the principal limitations in achieving robust classification if the choice of the correct
target metric is uncertain?
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we initiate the systematic study of this question. That is, motivated by the examples
and empirical attacks above, in which determining the true target metric constitutes a somewhat
ill-posed problem, we investigate how uncertainty about the proper metric affects the feasibility of
robust classification. More concretely, we will consider a setting in which there is not just a single
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metric which constrains the budget of the adversary, but rather some metric in an entire class C of
potential target metrics. We investigate whether there are learning tasks for which simultaneously
1. Robust classification is possible if the precise target metric is known.
2. Robust classification is impossible if the target metric is adversarially chosen from a class
of metrics after the model has been trained.
We will phrase our results in the PAC Learning Model [47], where a learning algorithm is given
labeled samples and produces a model h, and later a classification algorithm Ch is tasked with
determining the class of a given sample x. Robust classification for PAC learning is defined analo-
gously as in the introduction.
Assume that a learning task admits property 1 above, that is if the learning algorithm is provided
with the target metric then it can train a robust classifier in this metric. Now consider a trivial
learning algorithm L0 which stores the entire training data in the model h0 and essentially defers the
learning phase to the classifierCh0 . Once the learning algorithm is provided an adversarial example
x˜ and, for the sake of this outline, the target metric, the classifier Ch0 can train a model on the
fly by running the robust learning algorithm for the target metric on the training data provided in
h0. Consequently, this classifier Ch0 will be robust in every metric in the class contradicting point
2. Thus, we need to pose a non-triviality condition on the size of the model h, restricting it to be
significantly smaller in size than the training data provided to the learner L. Such a size restriction
is far from exotic, as obtaining small models has always been desirable in the ML community [12,
21, 29, 35]. To summarize, the question we consider is only meaningful if the size of the model h is
suitably bounded. Having laid out these boundary conditions, we can now describe our results.
Theorem 1 (Informal) Let λ be a security parameter and let n, ℓ be integers, possibly depending on
λ, where ℓ ≫ n, λ. Under mild cryptographic assumptions, there exists a binary learning problem
Π and a class C of metrics for which
1. Samples are of (small) size n · λ
2. Robust classification of Π is possible with (small) models of size ℓ if the precise target
metric is known to the learning algorithm L.
3. Robust classification is possible with (large) models of size n · ℓ for any metric in C.
4. There exists an efficient adversary A, which fools every efficient classifier with models of
size < n/2 · ℓ for an adversarially chosen target metric in C.
It is instructive to think of the size parameter ℓ as significantly larger than all other parameters. In
concrete terms, an exemplifying parameter choice is n ≈ 104, λ = 103, k = n/4 and ℓ = 1010.
For this parameter set, the samples are of reasonable size 107, a classifier with robustness against a
single target metric is of size 1010, but no classifier of size smaller than 2.5 · 1012 is robust against
an adversarially chosen metric.
Perspective Our results show that there are learning tasks for which the only viable strategy for
robust classification is to essentially include the entire training data in the model if the target metric
is not precisely known. Such a classifier however fails at the essential task of condensing the infor-
mation provided in the training dataset, and fails to generalize beyond the training data. Thus, the
goals of compactness and robustness in an uncertain metric are fundamentally at odds.
On a technical level, we demonstrate a novel way of leveraging techniques that originate from
bounded-storage model cryptography [37, 6, 7, 14, 20] to establish lower bounds on the size of
the model in robust classification. Our approach deviates from prior results in this line of research
and we expect it to be applicable in other settings.
2 Technical Outline
We will now provide an overview of our construction. The full construction with all proofs is
provided in the Appendix.
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︸ ︷︷ ︸
Defender
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attacker 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attacker 2
Figure 1: A simplified example of our construction. The data is drawn from R4×5, dark squares
are features where wi is large or i ∈ T. These are defended features for the defender. Attacker 1’s
feature were known, she cannot mislead the defender’s classifier. Attacker 2 operates under a differ-
ent metric, and is able to alter a feature that the classifier is not robust in (depicted in red/hatched).
Consequently, the defender is vulnerable in attacker 2’s metric.
The PAC Model We briefly recall the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) Learning frame-
work [47]. A learning problem Π consists of an instance space X, a set of classes C and a set of
distributions {χc}c∈C, where each χc is supported onX. We say that for a class c ∈ C χc samples
instances of class c. For concreteness, we will only consider learning problems with two classes,
i.e. C = {0, 1}. We allow the problem Π to be parametrized by a secret state st, such that one
can efficiently sample from the distributions χb given the state st. We say that Π is learnable if
there exist PPT algorithms L, called the learner, and C, called the classifier such that the following
holds. The learner L is given labeled samples (xi, bi) of Π, where xi ←$ χbi , and produces a small
model h. Then, the classifierCh, parametrized by h, is challenged with determining the class b of a
given sample x. We define the advantage of Ch by AdvΠ(Ch) = Pr[Ch(x) = b] −
1
2 , where the
probability is taken over the random choice of both b ←$ {0, 1} and x ←$ χb. We say that (L,C)
(ǫ, δ)-PAC learns a problem Π, if Pr[AdvΠ(Ch) > ǫ] > 1 − δ, where the probability is taken over
the choice of the training data and the random coins of L. We say that a perturbation adversaryA
fools a classifier Ch with advantage ǫ, if it hold that Pr[Ch(A(x)) = 1 − b] ≥
1
2 + ǫ, where the
probability is taken over the random choice of b←$ {0, 1} and x←$ χb.
Weighted Hamming Metrics As described above, a crucial aspect of our work is that the metric
which constrains the adversary is not fully specified at the time the model is trained. We will consider
a simple but quite expressive class of metrics we call weighted hamming metrics. We visualize this
idea in Figure 1, and continue with the formalization. Fix a finite alphabet Σ and an integer n. For
a vector x ∈ Σn, we will call the components xi of x the features of x. The Hamming metric ∆ is
defined by ∆(x, z) =
∑n
i=1 1xi 6=zi for all x, z ∈ Σ
n. Here, 1xi 6=zi is an indicator function which
assumes the value 1 if xi 6= zi and 0 if xi = zi. We will augment the notion of Hamming metrics to
weighted Hamming metrics by introducing weights to the features. Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a positive real
vector. We define the weighted Hamming metric∆w by
∆w(x, z) =
n∑
i=1
wi · 1xi 6=zi
for all x, z ∈ Σn. First note that ∆w is in fact a metric, i.e. if ∆w(x, z) = 0 then x = z and
∆w(x, z) ≤ ∆w(x, z) +∆w(z, z) for all x, z, z ∈ Σn.
Weighted Hamming metrics allow us to weigh features differently, that is, perturbing features with
a high weight will be more costly for the adversary than perturbing features with small weights. To
simplify matters, we will normalize the adversary’s attack budget to 1, i.e. a perturbation x˜ of a
sample x is permitted by metric∆w if ∆w(x, x˜) < 1.
While weighted Hamming metrics are quite expressive in their ability to assign weights to features,
we will use them in a simplified manner. Specifically, we will assign the weightwi = 1 to a feature
to protect it, i.e. such a feature cannot be modified by the adversary. All remaining weightswi will
be chosen as suitably small reals. More specifically, fix an integers n and k. For a subset T ⊆ [n] of
size k, define the weightwT by
wi =
{
1 if i ∈ T
1/n otherwise
.
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For simplicity, write ∆T = ∆wT . It follows immediately from the definition of ∆T that if x and x˜
differ in a feature i ∈ T, that is if xi 6= x˜i, then ∆T(x, x˜) ≥ 1. As a consequence, any perturbation
of a sample x on a feature with index i ∈ T will exceed the adversaries budget. Consequently, we
can consider the features with indices in T as protected. The class of metrics we consider in our
constructions will be
C = {∆T|T ⊆ [n], |T| = t},
i.e. every set T ⊆ [n] of size t will give rise to a metric.
The Basic Construction We will now describe a simplified version of our learning problem Π.
The problem has two classes, labeled 0 and 1. Let b ∈ {0, 1}. For this construction we will use a
private key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec). A sample of class b consists of three encryptions
(Enc(k1, b),Enc(k2, b),Enc(k3, b)) of the bit b under three different keys k1, k2, k3. The secret state
st of the problem Π consists of the three feature keys k1, k2, k3. In this bare-bones version, this
classification problemΠ is obviously unlearnable, given that the encryption scheme is secure. Thus,
we will first consider a simplified setting in which the learning algorithm L is given access to the
secret state st = (k1, k2, k3) instead of samples from Π.
We will briefly argue that this simplification does not weaken the model. There is a simple transfor-
mation which augments the samples by a small amount of extra information and make the problem
Π PAC learnable. The idea is to add small shares of the secret state st = (k1, k2, k3) into every
sample. To achieve this we will use a variant of Shamir’s secret sharing [43]. More concretely, let
F be a finite field of size 2λ and assume we can represent st as a vector (s1, . . . , st) for t = 3ℓ/λ,
where each si ∈ F. Define the polynomial f(X) =
∑t
i=1 siX
i−1. Now include into every sample
x the pair (z, f(z)), where z ←$ F is chosen uniformly at random. Note that since both z and f(z)
are in F, the pair (z, f(z)) can be described using 2λ bits and is therefore small. Observe that given
t pairs (z1, f(z1)), . . . , (zt, f(zt)) for distinct zi we can interpolate the polynomial f and recover
(s1, . . . , st) and therefore st = (k1, k2, k3). Since the zi are chosen uniformly at random from F, the
z1, . . . , zt will be distinct except with negligible probability. It follows that t samples are sufficient
to recover st = (k1, k2, k3).
Consequently, we will henceforth only consider the simplified setting in which the learning algo-
rithm is provided st = (k1, k2, k3) as input. Given the secret state st, there is a simple learning
algorithm for the problem Π: Just pick the first key k1 and include it in the model h. Then, given a
sample x = (c1, c2, c3), a classifierCh can use k1 to decrypt c1 and obtain the class b. Obviously, so
far there is no mechanism in place which disincentivizes the learner to include all 3 keys k1, k2, k3
in the model h. Our main idea is to make the keys k1, k2, k3 very large in order to penalize storing
storing all of them in h. Assume for now that each key ki is of size ℓ ≫ n, that is storing even a
single key is costly.
Now we will turn to robust classification of this problem. As the class of metrics we will consider
the class C defined above, that is the metrics are of the form ∆T for a set T ⊆ [3] of size 2. Since
by construction of ∆T the features with index i ∈ T are protected, this leaves just a single feature
with index in the singleton set [3]\T which the adversary is allowed to perturb. Note that a classifier
Ch in possession of all 3 keys k1, k2, k3 will be able to robustly classify this problem for any metric
in the class as follows. Since every metric in the class constrains the adversary to perturbing just
a single feature, we have the guarantee that 2 out of the 3 features are unmodified. Thus, given an
instance x = (c1, c2, c3) Ch decrypts c1, c2 and c3 obtaining bits b1, b2, b3, and sets the bit b to the
majority of b1, b2, b3. Since at most one of the bi is perturbed,Ch will classify correctly.
Next assume that the model h is just big enough to store a single key ki for i ∈ [3]. If the learner
L knows the target metric ∆T in advance, it can choose i such that i ∈ T, i.e. the feature with
index i is protected and thus the key ki is sufficient to classify robustly in the metric ∆T. But
now assume that the learner does not know the target metric and the model can only store a single
key. Thus, the learning algorithm needs to commit which feature i∗ the classifier will inspect by
selecting a key ki∗ , and this decision cannot be altered after the fact. Thus, if the target metric∆T is
such that i∗ /∈ T, then we can construct a perturbation adversary A which fools any classifier into
misclassifying perturbed examples as follows. Given a sample x = (c1, c2, c3) for class b,A outputs
a sample ˜point = (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3) where c
′
i∗ = Enc(ki∗ , 1 − b) but c
′
j = cj for j 6= i
∗. Observe that
∆T(x, x˜) = 1/3, thus this modification is within the adversary’s budget. Now, given the perturbed
example x˜, since the classifier only knows the key ki∗ , it must base its decision solely on the feature
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ci∗ as by the security of the encryption scheme the contents of the other two ciphertexts are hidden
from the classifier’s view. Thus, from the classifier’s view, x˜ looks like a legit sample of class 1− b,
and it will consequently misclassify x˜ as class 1 − b. In this simplified example there are only 3
possible choices for the index i∗, so the index i∗ can be found by brute force search and testing for
which i∗ the classifier misclassifies. Hence, if the adversary is allowed to choose the target metric
adaptively depending on the classifier Ch, there is an attack which perfectly fools the classifier,
under the condition that the classifier only knows a single key ki∗ . In this (over-)simplified analysis,
we conclude that for an after-the-fact chosen target metric no classifier that takes a model h of size ℓ
is robust, whereas we have seen above that if the target metric is known to the learner size ℓ suffices.
The high-level approachwe have outlined here critically relies on the fact that the learning algorithm
L can only provide a bounded amount of information to the classifierC via the model h. Leveraging
memory limitations to establish security properties is a well-established research topic in cryptog-
raphy. The bounded storage model [37] admits unconditionally secure protocols for tasks such as
key-exchange [37, 6, 20] and secure two-party computation [7, 14], which are known to require
computational assumptions in the standard model. In the same spirit as prior works that establish
lower bounds [4, 15, 36], we make use of cryptography against the learning algorithm and classifier.
But while prior works made use of cryptographic constructions that are secure against all efficient
algorithms, our goal is to only establish hardness results when the model h is of bounded size.
The Full-Fledged Construction In general, we want to achieve a larger gap between the two
cases. We will achieve this by modifying the problem in the following way. Instead of having
just 3 features, instances of the new problem Π will have n features. Furthermore, for technical
reasons we will rely on a public key encryption scheme KeyGen,Enc,Dec rather than a private
key encryption scheme. Specifically, to make our argument work we need that the adversary A
can generate samples of the problem Π without knowledge of the entire large secret state st =
(sk1, . . . , skn) but only knows small secret keys pk1, . . . , pkn. Thus, we will require a public key
encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) which has small public keys pk, but arbitrarily larger secret
keys sk.
For our fully-fledged construction, an instance x of the problem Π is of the form x = (c1, . . . , cn),
where each ci ← Enc(pki, b) is an encryption of the class b under a public key pki. We choose the
class C to consist of all metrics∆T, where T ⊆ [n] is a set of size n/2+1. This choice of C ensures
that there always is a robust classifier with model h of size n · ℓ, namely the classifier in possession
of all keys sk1, . . . , skn which decrypts all ci and makes a majority decision.
We now want to argue that whenever the model h is of size at most n/2− 1, then for every classifier
C there exists an efficient adversaryA which chooses a target metric∆T and foolsCh in this metric.
Recall that we allow the adversary A to make oracle-queries to Ch. Thus, we essentially need to
construct an adversary which learns which keysCh knows by only making oracle access to Ch. To
actually realize this idea, we will need an encryption scheme with stronger guarantees, as we will
discuss in the next paragraph.
Big-Key Encryption The argument sketched so far is overly simplistic in several aspects. We
assumed that the only strategy of the learner and classifier is to store the secret keys ski in full. In
general, the standard security notion for public key encryption, indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security) does not provide any guarantees if the adversary is given even
a small fraction of the secret key sk. Recall that the learning algorithm L is given all secret keys
sk1, . . . , skn as input and thus the model h may contain a small amount of information about each
of these secret keys. Thus, constructing an encryption scheme which merely has large secret keys
is insufficient to force a learning algorithm to dedicate a large amount of the model h to store
such keys. In particular, requiring that the secret keys are large does not preclude that there is an
alternative decryption procedure which requires a significantly smaller amount of information about
the secret key. Consequently, we need a stronger security property which captures the requirement
that keys are large and incompressible and that missing even a small fraction of the key will render
a partial key useless for decryption.
The notion of big-key encryption [2] offers a strong form of leakage resilience. In such a scheme,
the key-generation algorithm KeyGen takes as additional input a size parameter ℓ and produces
uniformly random keys of size ℓ. We note that whereas [2] defined big-key encryption in the private
key setting, we will use an analog notion for public key encryption, where we require that secret keys
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are very large, but both the size public keys and ciphertexts are small, only depending on the security
parameter. Big-key encryption was conceived to provide strong leakage resilience guarantees and
to prevent key-exfiltration attacks. In [2] security of big-key encryption is defined via a notion
called subkey prediction security. We will use a conceptually somewhat simpler notion we call
key-knowledge security. We will briefly outline this security notion.
Recall that the standard security notion of public key encryption, indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security) requires that encryptions of 0 and 1 are indistinguishable for
PPT distinguishers, given only the public key. An important aspect about IND-CPA security is that
that the distinguisher gets no information about the secret key.
We will define key-knowledge security via the following two stage experiment between a challenger
and a pair (L,D) of leaker L and distinguisher D. The challenger generates keys (pk, sk) ←
KeyGen(1λ, ℓ) and runs the leakerL on input (pk, sk), anL will output a hint h. The distinguisher
Dh (parametrized by h) is given the public key pk and an encryption of a random bit b as input and
outputs a bit b′. We define the advantage ofDh as Adv(Dh) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|.
We say that a big-key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is key-knowledge secure, if for every
pair of PPT algorithms (L,D) there exists a PPT algorithm E, called the extractor, such that the
following holds. For every inverse-polynomial ǫ = ǫ(λ), we require that if Adv(Dh) > ǫ, then
E(h, ǫ) = sk, except with negligible probability over the choice of (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ) and
h← L(pk, sk). That is
Pr
k,h
[Adv(Dh) > ǫ and E(h, ǫ) 6= sk] < negl(λ)
We allow the runtime of E to be poly(λ, 1/ǫ). In essence, this security notion requires that if for
a given hint h the distinguisher Dh is able to distiguish encryptions of 0 and 1, then the hint h
must somehow encode the secret key sk. Note in particular that this notion does not impose a size
restriction on the hint h.
In the Appendix of this work we provide a construction of public key key-knowledge secure big-key
encryption in the standard model. Our construction is based on a recent construction of maliciously
secure laconic conditional disclosure of secrets (laconic CDS) [17], which builds heavily on the
distinguisher-dependent simulation technique [19, 31, 18]. In particular, we can provide construc-
tions of key-knowledge secure big-key encryption under standard assumptions such as the Deci-
sional Diffie Hellman assumption [22] or the Learning with Errors assumption [39]. We will omit
the details of the constructions for this overview.
Learning the Classifier’s keys Equipped with the notion of key-knowledge secure big-key en-
cryption, we will complete this outline by showing that if the target metric is unknown to the learner
for problemΠ, then there exists an efficient attack A which fools every classifierCh with model of
size at most n/2 · ℓ in an adaptively chosen metric in the class C. Recall that we allow the adversary
A to make oracle queries to the classifier Ch. The underlying idea our attack is based on is thatA
can detect which keys ski the classifier Ch knows by making oracle access to Ch. This high-level
idea is implemented as follows. For concreteness, we will first discuss how A can detect whether
the classifier knows the key sk1. Assume that AdvΠ(Ch) = ǫ for some ǫ > 0 and set γ ≪ ǫ, where
we will determine the exact choice of γ later.
Consider a modified problemΠ′, which slightly differs fromΠ in the way instances are sampled. To
sample an instance x = (c1, . . . , cn) of class b ∈ {0, 1} for Π′, compute c1 ← Enc(pk1, 1− b) and
ci ← Enc(pki, b) for all indices i 6= 1. That is c1 encrypts the flipped bit 1 − b, whereas all other
ciphertexts ci encrypt the bit b. Thus, instances of Π and Π
′ differ in the first feature c1.
Note that given the (short) keys pk1, . . . , pkn, the adversaryA can efficiently sample from both Π
and Π′. Consequently, by running Ch on many samples of Π and Π
′, A can compute an approx-
imation ǫ˜ of ǫ = AdvΠ(Ch) and an approximation ǫ˜
′ of ǫ′ = AdvΠ′(Ch). Using the Hoeffding
bound we can establish that if the approximations were computed using O(1/γ2) samples, then the
approximation errors are smaller than γ, except with negligible probability. That is, we can make
the approximation error γ arbitrarily small at the cost of a runtime overhead of O(1/γ2). Now
distinguish the following two cases:
1. |ǫ˜− ǫ˜′| < 3γ
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2. |ǫ˜− ǫ˜′| ≥ 3γ
In the first case it follows that |ǫ − ǫ′| < 5γ. Given that γ is sufficiently smaller than ǫ, we can treat
ǫ′ and ǫ as essentially the same and determine that the classifierCh is insensitive to the modification
of c1. In the second case however, A will determine that Ch is sensitive to the modification of
c1 and conclude that Ch must know sk1. This can be established as follows: First, note that |ǫ˜ −
ǫ˜′| ≥ 3γ implies |ǫ − ǫ′| > γ. Furthermore, noting that instances of Π and Π′ only differ in the
first feature, we can use Ch to construct a distinguisher Dh which distinguishes Enc(pk1, 0) and
Enc(pk1, 1) with advantage γ. However, by the key-knowledge security of the encryption scheme
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec), there exists an extractor E such that E(st, γ) = sk1, except with negligible
probability over the choice of sk1 and st.
Depending on whether A determined that Ch is sensitive to the modification of c1 or not, A will
proceed as follows. If it determined that Ch is insensitive to this modification, then it will set
Π1 = Π
′. On the other hand, if it determined that Ch is sensitive to the modification of c1, it will
set Π1 = Π. Note that in either case |AdvΠ(Ch)−AdvΠ1(Ch)| < 3γ, so essentially AdvΠ1(Ch) ≈
AdvΠ(Ch). Now A will continue this procedure for the second feature, i.e. it will modify Π1
into Π′1 by computing c2 via c2 ← Enc(pk2, 1 − b). By iterating this procedure A will be able to
determine all indices i ∈ [n] for which Ch is sensitive in feature i. Moreover, call the sequence of
hybrid problems defined in this process Π1, . . . ,Πn.
The key insight is now the following: We claim that if the model h is of size ≤ (k + 1) · ℓ− λ, then
Ch cannot be sensitive in more than k features. To see this, note that by the above argument if Ch
is sensitive in k + 1 features, say i1, . . . , ik+1, then we can extract the keys ski1 , . . . , skik+1 from
Ch as described above. But now recall that the ski are uniformly random in {0, 1}ℓ. This means
that from the model h, which is of size ≤ (k+1) · ℓ− λ, we can recover a uniformly random string
(ski1 , . . . , skik+1) which is of size (k + 1) · ℓ. But by Shannon’s source coding theorem [44] this
is impossible. It follows that Ch is sensitive to at most k features, and A can detect the indices of
these features as outlined above. Let J ⊆ [n] be the set of indices of these features.
Now given that A has discovered the sensitive features of Ch, the actual attack works as follows.
Given a sample x = (c1, . . . , cn) for class 1 − b, for i ∈ J A replaces the ci by c′i = Enc(pki, b)
yielding an adversarial example x˜. Now note the following: By the way we constructed the set of
sensitive features J , the adversarial example x˜ is an instance of the hybrid problem Πn for class b.
But this means thatPr[Ch(x˜) = b] ≥
1
2+ǫ−n·γ, i.e., x˜ is classified as class bwith high probability
given that γ is suffciently smaller than ǫ/n. On the other hand, let T ⊆ [n] be a set of size ≤ n− k
such that T∩ J = ∅, i.e., none of the indices in J are protected by the metric∆T. Then it holds that
∆T(x, x˜) < 1, i.e. in the metric∆T the perturbation x˜ is in withinA’s perturbation budget.
To wrap up, we have shown thatA fools any classifier Ch for a model h of size at most k · ℓ in an
adaptively chosen metric∆T in the class C. This concludes this outline.
3 Related Work
Little formal work has been done concerning the importance of norm choices for robustness. De-
montis et al. [16] investigate the relationship between the L0 and L∞ norms for linear classifiers.
At the same time, Croce and Hein [11] show that a regularizer for both L0 and L∞ can be con-
structed. Such a regularizer is then robust in all Lp-norms. Our work instead formalizes the problem
of choosing the right metric, and the resulting problem of remaining vulnerable in another metric.
There are formal works in adversarialML that show impossibilities to achieve robustness for specific
classifiers [49]. Other works are also based on the PAC framework, but derive complexity bounds in
Lp (p > 1) norms [13]. Alternatively, works reason that generalization enables vulnerability [28] or
that a robust classifier needs more data to train than its vulnerable counterpart [41]. Further, Chen et
al. [9] propose a formal argument about feature discretization, also using Hamming metrics in their
reasoning. However they derive a robustness boost given sufficiently well separated data among
other properties. In this work, we show an impossibility result based on cryptographic primitives for
the problem of choosing the right metric for a classifier in the context of robustness.
To conclude, we review again the works that are related to cryptographic primitives. Most works
aim to derive impossibility results for robustness. Bubeck et al. [5] use the statistical query model
and two statistically similar distributions. In this setting, learning is possible, whereas robust learn-
8
ing is not. This contradiction is derived by, in a nutshell, adding the label to the sample [15].
Bubeck et al. [4] rely on a similar construction, however using a pseudo-random number generator.
The construction in our paper is instead based on ideas from cryptography in the bounded storage
model [20]. Furthermore, we extend previous settings to a learnable task that is robust to random
noise. Vulnerability then arises as the learner does not know the metric the attacker will choose in
advance. We also represent the learner as an entity that compresses the structures presented in the
data, additionally to the efficiency requirement. Another line of work rooted in cryptography aims
to leverage computational hardness to increase the difficulty to compute adversarial examples. For
example, Mahloujifar and Mahmoody [36] show using signatures that computational hardness can
be used to harden the task solved by an L0 attacker. Garg et al. [24] extend this work to other metrics
and a game based definition for robustness.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed a classification problem which admits robust classification by a small
classifier if the target metric is known at training time. However, robust classification is impossible
for small classifiers if the target metric is chosen after training. In the process, we explored a novel
connection between hardness of robust classification an bounded storage model cryptography.
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A Overview
This Appendix contains the formal proofs and constructions with their corresponding background.
We split this content into three parts, of which we here give a brief overview.
B - Encryption with Key-Knowledge Security. Our construction is based on a public key encryp-
tion scheme. To encompass the size constraint in relation to robustness, we require secret keys to
be arbitrarily large, whereas the ciphertexts and public keys are compact. This leaves us with the
problem that a partial key might suffice to reconstruct the original message or sample. We thus
require additionally a strengthened security guarantee that any adversary that is able to distinguish
encrypted messages with non-negligible advantage must know the whole corresponding secret key.
The first section formalizes and verifies these properties to lay the foundation for our constructions.
C - Definition of PAC and robust PAC learning. In addition to the previously formalized en-
cryption scheme, we also define learning and in particular robust learning. To this end, we use the
Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework [47]. We distinguish two notions of
robustness, strongly robust PAC learning and weakly robust PAC learning. Roughly speaking, a
strongly robust classifier cannot be fooled at all. A weakly robust classifier represents a more realis-
tic scenario, where the classifier contains some form of outlier detection. In the case of weakly robust
PAC learning, the attacker is able to succeed if she reliably triggers this outlier class (comparable to
DDoS attack on a server), or alternatively is able to craft a confidently classified example.
D - Our Construction. This last section combines the building blocks into our construction. We
first define a learning task and the small classifier that is robust in one metric. Then, we describe the
large classifier that is robust in any metric and conclude with the impossibility result.
Before we start with the encryption scheme, we recap the definition of weighted hamming metrics
as given in the main paper. The metric is defined over a finite alphabet Σ. We write vector x ∈ Σn,
with n components or features, each referred as xi. For two x, z ∈ Σ
n, we define the Hamming
metric ∆ as ∆(x, z) =
∑n
i=1 1xi 6=zi . The metric is based on the indicator function 1xi 6=zi which
assumes the value 1 if xi 6= zi and 0 otherwise. As stated in the main paper, we augment the notion
of Hamming metrics to weighted Hamming metrics. Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a positive real vector. We
define the weighted Hamming metric∆w as
∆w(x, z) =
n∑
i=1
wi · 1xi 6=zi
for all x, z ∈ Σn. Note that∆w is in fact a metric, i.e. if∆w(x, z) = 0 then x = z and∆w(x, z) ≤
∆w(x, z) +∆w(z, z) for all x, z, z ∈ Σn.
The weights of the metric are directly linked to the attacker: perturbing a feature with a high weight
will be more costly for the adversary than perturbing features with small weights. We further normal-
ize the adversary’s attack budget to 1. In other words, a perturbation x˜ is allowed if∆w(x, x˜) < 1.
We further simplify the weights and assign weight wi = 1 to a feature to protect it: if wi = 1, xi
cannot be modified by the adversary. Given integers n and k, for a subset T ⊆ [n] of size k, define
the weightwT by
wi =
{
1 if i ∈ T
1/n otherwise
.
For simplicity, we write ∆T = ∆wT . For two points x and x˜, ∆T(x, x˜) ≥ 1 if both points differ
in a feature i ∈ T, hence xi 6= x˜i. In other words, the adversaries budget is exceeded if a feature
with index i ∈ T is perturbed: the feature is protected. The class of metrics we consider in our
constructions is
C = {∆T|T ⊆ [n], |T| = t},
i.e. every set T ⊆ [n] of size t will give rise to a metric.
B Big-Key Encryption with Key-Knowledge Security
In this Section we will discuss a type of public key encryption scheme we call encryption with key
knowledge. This is a standard encryption schemewhich comeswith the following strengthened secu-
rity guarantee: Any adversary which distinguishes encryptions of (say) 0 and 1 with non-negligible
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advantagemust know the corresponding secret key. We will construct such encryption schemes with
arbitrarily large secret keys but compact ciphertexts. Conforming with previous works, we will call
this type of encryption big-key encryption. For the sake of simplicity, we we only define big-key
encryption for binary messages m ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 1 A big-key encryption scheme consists of 3 algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) with the
following syntax.
• KeyGen(1λ, ℓ): Takes as input a security parameter 1λ and a size-parameter ℓ and outputs
a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• Enc(pk,m): Takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a
ciphertext c
• Dec(sk, c): Takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m′ ∈
{0, 1}.
Assume for simplicity that the message space is {0, 1}. We require the following properties.
• Correctness: It holds for every message m ∈ {0, 1} that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) = m, where
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, ℓ).
• Compactness: Secret keys sk are of size at most ℓ · λ. Public keys pk and ciphertexts c
are of size poly(λ) and in particular independent of ℓ. Furthermore, we require that the
runtime of Enc is also poly(λ) independent of ℓ.
We define security of big-key encryption via a notion we call key-knowledge security. In a nutshell,
this notion requires that an adversary who can distinguish encryptions of 0 and 1 under a public key
pk must know the corresponding secret key sk. This is formalized via a knowledge extractor E.
Definition 2 (Key-Knowledge Security) Let (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a big-key encryption scheme.
Consider the following 2-phase security experiment with a two-stage adversaryA = (A1,A2).
Stage S1(1
λ,A1):
• Compute (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, ℓ)
• st←A1(1
λ, pk, sk)
• Output (st, pk)
Stage S2(A2, b, st, pk):
• Compute c∗ ← Enc(pk, b)
• Compute b′ ← A2(st, pk, c∗)
• If b′ = b output 1, otherwise 0.
Assume without loss of generality that st contains pk. Fix an intermediate output (st, pk) ←
S1(1
λ,A1) and let ExpA(st) be the output of the experiment with intermediate state st, i.e.
ExpbA(st) = S2(A2, b, st). The advantage ofA2 is defined by
Advst(A2) = Pr[Exp
0
A(st) = 1]− Pr[Exp
1
A(st) = 1].
We say that a big-key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is key-knowledge secure, if there exists
a PPT extractor E, such that for every PPT adversaryA = (A1,A2) the following holds. For every
inverse-polynomial ǫ it holds that
Pr[Advst(A) > ǫ and E(A, ǫ) 6= sk] < ǫ,
except for finitely many λ. Here the probability is taken over the random choice of st. Here, the
runtime of E(A, ǫ) is poly(λ, 1/ǫ).
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B.1 Malicious Laconic Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
In order to construct key-knowledge secure big-key encryption, we will make use of a recently intro-
duced primitive called malicious laconic conditional disclosure of secrets, or lCDS for for short [17].
An lCDS scheme lets can be seen as a two round witness-encryption scheme [23], in which the first
message of the receiver commits to the witness. The feature of interest of lCDS is that the size of both
the commitment and ciphertexts is independent of the size of the witness. This almost immediately
implies a big-key encryption scheme. All we need additionally is an NP-language which has small
statements but large and incompressible witnesses. We can construct such a language using collision
resistant hash functions.
Definition 3 LetL be an NP-language and let RL be its witness-relation. An laconic CDS scheme
lCDS consists of four algorithms (Setup,Rec,Enc,Dec) with the following syntax.
Setup(1λ) : Takes as input the security paramter 1λ and outputs a common reference string crs.
Rec(crs, x,w) : Takes as input a common reference string crs, a statement x and a witness w and
outputs a a commitment com and a state st.
Enc(crs, x, com,m) : Takes as input a common reference string crs, a statement x, a commitment
com and a message m and outputs a ciphertext c.
Dec(crs, c, st) : Takes as input a common reference string crs, a ciphertext c and a state st and
outputs a message m′.
We require the following properties of laconic CDS scheme.
• Correctness: It holds that Pr[Dec(crs,Enc(crs, x, com,m), st) = m] = 1 given that crs←
Setup(1λ) and (com, st)← Rec(crs, x,w).
• Compactness: It holds that |com| and |c| are of size poly(λ) and in particular independent
of |w|.
Note that in general the state st could be substantially larger than the witness w. However, without
loss of generality we can assume that the state is of size |x| + |w| + λ, as the st can be recomputed
from crs, x,w and the random coins of Rec, which we can assume to be a PRG-seed of size λ.
In [17], the security of laconic CDS and laconic functionalities in general is defined via a notion
called context security. We briefly recall this definition and then show how it can be simplified for
our purposes.
Definition 4 (Protocol Context) We say that a PPT machine Z = (Z1,Z2) is a context for two
message protocols Π = (Setup,R1, S,R2), if it has the following syntactic properties: The first
stage Z1 takes as input a common reference string crs (generated by Setup) and random coins r1
and outputs a receiver message rec and a state st. The second phase Z2 takes as input the state st
and random coins r2. The second phase is allowed to make queries y to a sender oracle Ocrs,rec(y),
which are answered by S(crs, rec, y) (using fresh randomness from r2). In the end the context outputs
a bit b∗. DefineZ(1λ) by
• Choose random tapes r1, r2
• Compute crs← Setup(1λ)
• (st, rec)← Z1(crs, r1)
• b∗ ← Z
Ocrs,rec(·)
2 (st, r2)
• Output b∗
We will now provide our definition of context security.
Definition 5 Let Π = (Setup,R1, S,R2) be a two-message protocol realizing a two-party function-
ality F. We say that Π is context-secure if the following holds for every Π-context Z = (Z1,Z2).
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We require that there exists a context extractor ExtZ and a simulators Sim such that the following
holds for every δ > 0:
(1) ExtZ takes as input crs, st, rec, random coins r∗ and a parameter δ and outputs a value x∗
and an auxiliary string aux. ExtZ has overhead poly(λ) · T2, where T2 is the overhead of
Z2 and the polynomial is independent of Z, only depending on λ.
(2) Sim takes as input rec, aux and a value z and outputs a sender-message snd. We require
The overhead of Sim to be polynomial in the overhead of λ, but independent ofZ1 andZ2.
(3) The experiment EZ(1λ, δ) is defined by
• Choose random tapes r1, r2
• Compute crs← Setup(1λ)
• (st, rec)← Z1(crs, r1)
• (x∗, aux)← ExtZ(crs, st, rec, r∗, δ)
• b∗ ← Z
O
′(·)
2 (st, r2), where O
′(y) computes and outputs Sim(rec, aux,F(x∗, y))
• Output b∗
(4) (Security) It holds for every inverse polynomial ǫ = ǫ(λ) that
|Pr[Z(1λ) = 1]− Pr[EZ(1λ, ǫ) = 1]| < ǫ,
except for finitely many λ.
For the case of laconic CDS, the functionality F is just the conditional disclosure functionality
Fcds: Fcds(w, (x,m)) takes as input a witness w by the receiver and a pair (x,m) of statement x and
message m by the sender. If (x,w) ∈ RL it outputsm to the receiver, otherwise ⊥.
We will now show that context security implies the following simplified security notion for laconic
CDS, which will use in our construction. In fact, this security notion is analogous to the notion
of extractable witness encryption [27], which requires that any adversary which can distinguish
ciphertexts must know a witness.
Definition 6 (Witness-Knowledge Security) Let lCDS = (Setup,Rec,Enc,Dec) be a laconic
CDS scheme. Consider the following 2-phase security experiment with a two-stage adversary
A = (A1,A2).
Stage S1(1
λ,A1):
• Compute crs← Setup(1λ)
• (x, com, st)←A1(1
λ, crs)
• Output (crs, x, com, st)
Stage S2(A2, b, x, com, st):
• Compute c∗ ← Enc(crs, x, com, b)
• Compute b′ ← A2(st, c∗)
• If b′ = b output 1, otherwise 0.
Fix the output (crs, x, com, st)← S1(1
λ,A1) of the first stage and assume without loss of generality
that st contains crs, x, com. Let ExpA(st) be the output of the experiment with intermediate state st,
i.e. ExpbA(st) = S2(A2, b, crs, x, com, st). For a given state st, we define the advantage ofA2 by
Advst(A2) = Pr[Exp
0
A(st) = 1]− Pr[Exp
1
A(st) = 1].
We say that an encryption scheme (Setup,Enc,Dec) is witness-knowledge secure or extractable, if
there exists a PPT extractor E, such that for every PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) the following
holds. For every inverse-polynomial ǫ it holds that
Pr[Advst(A2) > ǫ and E(A2, st, ǫ) 6= sk] < ǫ,
except for finitely many λ. Here the probability is taken over the random choice of st. Here, we
allow the runtime of E to be poly(λ, 1/ǫ).
15
We will now show that context security implies witness-knowledge security for lCDS.
Theorem 2 Assume that a laconic CDS scheme lCDS is context-secure. Then it is also witness-
knowledge secure.
Proof 1 Let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary against the witness-knowledge security of lCDS. De-
fine a protocol contextZ = (Z1,Z2) as follows. Z1 takes as input a crs crs and runs the first stage
S1(1
λ,A1) of the security experiment (S1, S2) defined in Definition 5, however using its own input
crs as a common reference string instead of generating it in S1. If the output of S2 is x, com, st, Z1
sets rec = (x, com) and outputs (st, rec).
Z2 takes as input the state st, chooses a random bit b ←$ {0, 1} and essentially runs the second
stage S2(A2, b, crs, x, com, st) of the experiment in Definition 5, with the difference that it does
not compute c∗ by itself, but uses its oracle access to Enc(crs, x, com, ·) to compute the challenge
ciphertext c∗.
By construction of Z1, it holds that Z1(crs) faithfully emulates the first stage of the experiment
S1(1
λ,A1). Moreover, for any crs, x, com, st it holds that Z
Enc(crs,x,com,·)
2 (st) faithfully simulates
the second stage of the experiment S2(A2, b, crs, x, com, st) for a randomly chosen bit b←$ {0, 1}.
Thus it follows that
Pr[Z
Enc(crs,x,com,·)
2 (1
λ) = 1] =
1
2
+
1
2
Advst(A2).
Since lCDS is context-secure, there exists a context-extractor ExtZ such that for every inverse poly-
nomial ǫ it holds that
|Pr[Z(1λ) = 1]− Pr[EZ(1λ, ǫ) = 1]| < ǫ. (1)
We can now define the extractor E for witness-knowledge security via E(A2, st, ǫ) =
ExtZ(crs, st, (x, com), ǫ2/2). Note that we provide ǫ2/2 instead of ǫ to ExtZ. Now we claim that
for every inverse polynomial ǫ it holds that
Pr[Advst(A2) > ǫ and (x,Ext(A2, st, ǫ)) /∈ RL] ≤ ǫ.
If this was not the case, then there exist inverse polynomial ǫ such that
Pr[Advst(A2) > ǫ and (x,Ext(A2, st, ǫ)) /∈ RL] > ǫ
for infinitely many λ.
Call st good if Pr[Advst(A2) > ǫ and (x,Ext(A2, st, ǫ)) /∈ RL. I.e. the above states that
Pr[st good ] > ǫ. Now note that if st is good, then
Pr[Z(1λ) = 1|st good] =
1
2
+
1
2
Advst(A2) ≥
1
2
+
ǫ
2
,
as st good implies that Advst(A2) > ǫ. Moreover, st good also implies that (x,Ext(A2, st, ǫ)) /∈
RL. Consequently, if w = Ext(A2, st, ǫ) then the functionality Fcds(w, (x, ·)) always outputs ⊥,
and therefore challenge ciphertext c∗ in the experiment EZ is independent of the bit b. It follows
that
Pr[EZ(1λ, ǫ2/2) = 1|st good] =
1
2
.
Thus, it follows that
|Pr[Z(1λ) = 1]− Pr[EZ(1λ, ǫ2/2) = 1]|
≥ |Pr[Z(1λ) = 1|st good]− Pr[EZ(1λ, ǫ2/2) = 1|st good]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ǫ/2
Pr[st good]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ǫ
≥ ǫ2/2.
This however is in contradiction to (1). We conclude that for every inverse polynomial ǫ it holds that
Pr[Advst(A2) > ǫ and (x,Ext(A2, st, ǫ)) /∈ RL] ≤ ǫ,
which shows that lCDS is witness-knowledge secure.
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B.2 Big-Key Encryption fromMalicious Laconic Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
We will now provide a construction of a big-key encryption scheme from laconic CDS. The basic
idea is simple: Let Hk : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}λ be a collision-resistant hash function and consider
the language L = {(k, h) ∈ {0, 1}λ | ∃z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ s.t. h = Hk(z)} with the witness relation
RL = {((k, h), z) | h = Hk(z)}. Now let lCDS = (Setup,Rec,Enc,Dec) be a laconic CDS for
the witness relation RL. The big-key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is given as
follows.
• KeyGen(1λ, ℓ): Choose k ←$ {0, 1}
λ, z ←$ {0, 1}
ℓ and set h ← Hk(z). Compute crs ←
lCDS.Setup(1λ), (com, st) ← lCDS.Rec(crs, (k, h), z) and output pk ← (crs, k, h, com)
and sk← (pk, st)
• Enc(pk = (crs, k, h, com),m): Compute and output c← lCDS.Enc(crs, (k, h), com,m).
• Dec(sk = ((crs, k, h, com), z), c): Compute and outputm← lCDS.Dec(crs, (k, h), z, c)
Correctness of this scheme follows immediately from the correctness of lCDS. Moreover, note that
by the compactness of lCDS we have that |pk| and |c| are poly (λ) but independent of the size
parameter ℓ.
We will now show that PKE is key-knowledge secure, given that lCDS is witness-knowledge secure
and the hash function H is collision resistant.
Theorem 3 Assume that lCDS satisfies witness-knowledge security and H is collision-resistant.
Then PKE is key-knowledge secure.
Proof 2 LetA = (A1,A2) be an adversary against PKE with inverse-polynomial advantage ǫ.
By an averaging argument, we can fix k ∈ {0, 1}λ and z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that Adv(A) > ǫ.
Thus, we get that for the statement x = (k,Hk(z)) the adversary A has advantage ǫ against lCDS.
By the key-knowledge security of lCDS there exists an extractor Ext such that z′ ← Ext(A, ǫ) is a
valid witness for x, except with probability ǫ over the choice of crs and com. We claim that z′ = z,
except with negligible probability, which establishes that Ext is a key-extractor forA.
To see this, assume that z′ 6= z with non-negligible probability ǫ′. We can then use Ext(A, ǫ)
construct a collision-finding adversary B against the hash function H as follows:
• Input a hashing key k
• Choose z ←$ {0, 1}
ℓ uniformly at random and set h← Hk(z)
• Compute crs← lCDS.Setup(1λ)
• Compute (com, st)← lCDS.Rec(crs, (k, h), z)
• Compute st←A1(crs, st)
• Compute z′ ← Ext(A2(st), ǫ)
• Output z, z′
First notice that B is a PPT machine asA1(crs, st) and Ext(A2(st), ǫ) are PPT. Observe that from
the view of A, B simulates the ciphertext indistinguishability experiment faithfully. Consequently,
if Ext(A, ǫ) outputs a valid witness z′ 6= z with non-negligible ǫ′, which contradicts the collision-
resistance of H.
Thus, we have established that
Pr[Adv(A2) > ǫ and Ext(A2, ǫ) 6= sk] < negl(λ) ,
which concludes the proof.
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C PAC-Learning
We will first fix some syntax and notation relating to the PAC-model. A learning task Π consists of
the following objects.
• A set X called the instance space. In our setting X will canonically be a set of binary
strings of fixed length.
• A set C of classes. In our setting we will always have C = {0, 1}.
• A problem generator algorithm Gen(1λ), which is a randomized algorithm which takes as
input a parameter 1λ and generates a private state st.
• An algorithm Samp called instance sampler. Sampst(c) is indexed by a private state st,
takes as input a class-identifier c ∈ C and ouputs a sample x ∈ X .
The goal of a learning task is, given a list of labeled samples of the form (c, Sampst(c)) to train an
efficient classifier which identifies instances with classes. We formalize the process of learning and
classifying via the following two algorithmsL and C.
• The learning algorithmL, takes as input a list ofm labeled samples (c1,x1), . . . , (cm,xm)
and computes a model/hypothesis h. We will also writeLSampst(·) to denote thatL is given
access to an unbounded number of samples via oracle access to Sampst(·).
• The classification algorithm C receives as input a model h and an instance x and outputs a
class c ∈ C.
Fix a secret state st of the learning task Π. We define the advantage of a classifier C with hypothesis
h by
AdvΠ,st(Ch) = Pr[Ch(Sampst(c)) = c]−
1
|C|
,
where the probability is taken over the the random coins of Samp and the random choice of c←$ C.
The advantage of a classifier measures how much better it performs on average compared to just
blindly guessing the class of a given instance.
We can now define the PAC model.
Definition 7 (The PAC Model) Let Π = (X,C,Gen, Samp) be a learning task and let ǫ, δ > 0.
We say that Π is efficiently (ǫ, δ)-PAC-learnable, if there exist PPT algorithms L and C such that
the following holds:
Pr[AdvΠ,st(Ch) ≥ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ,
where st ← Gen(1λ) and h ← LSampst(·). Here, the probability is taken over the random coins of
Gen, L and the oracle Sampst(·).
We will only consider problems with two classes, i.e. C = {0, 1}. Thus the expression for the
advantage simplifies to
AdvΠ,st(Ch) = Pr[Ch(Sampst(b)) = b]−
1
2
,
where the probability is taken over the the random coins of Samp and the random choice of b ←$
{0, 1}.
In terms of efficiency, we are interested in learning algorithms which produce models h of minimal
size. Albeit there is no direct requirement for minimal model size, a growing body of works in ML
focuses on obtaining small models [12, 21, 29, 35]. More specifically, this can also be seen as
a non-triviality requirement for the learning algorithm in that the trivial strategy of just storing its
input in the model h fails at this requirement.
C.1 Robust Learning
We will now consider learning under adversarial examples, that is we consider how well a classifier
performs on inputs that are perturbed by an adversary. A perturbation adversary is an algorithm
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A which takes as input an instance x ∈ X and outputs a perturbed instance x˜ ∈ X . Moreover,
we will provide oracle-access to a classifier Ch to A to model that A can test the behavior of Ch
on adversarial examples. Robust classification is clearly impossible against adversaries which are
allowed to tamper arbitrarily. Hence, to provide a meaningful definition we need to constrain the
adversary. This is typically achieved by giving the adversary a perturbation budget specified by a
metric on the instance space X . Let ∆ be a metric on X . We say that an adversary A has budget
B, if it holds for all x ∈ X that ∆(x,A(x)) < B. For simplicity in the following, we will always
normalize the adversary’s budget to 1. This can always be achieved by rescaling the metric.
We will consider different flavors of robustness. A strongly robust classifier will not lose its advan-
tage, even if it receives adversarial examples as input. Fix a secret state st and a model h. For a
perturbation adversaryA, define the advantage under adversarial action as
AdvA,st(Ch) = Pr[Ch(A
Ch(·)(st, b, Sampst(b))) = c]−
1
2
,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of b ←$ {0, 1}, the random coins of Sampst
and the random coins ofA.
Definition 8 (Strongly Robust PAC Learning) Let Π = (X,C,Gen, Samp) be a learning task.
We say that Π is strongly robustly (ǫ, δ)-PAC-learnable in a metric ∆, if there exist PPT algorithms
L and C such that it holds for every∆-constrained PPT adversaryA that
Pr[AdvA,st(Ch) ≥ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ
where the probability is taken over the random coins of Gen,L and the oracle Sampst(·).
Note that in this definition, an adversary already wins if it diminishes the advantage of the classifier
Ch . That is, the adversary does not necessarily need to always fool the classifier. We will now define
a notion we call weak robustness which essentially requires that a successful adversary must fool
the classifier Ch into producing the opposite output.
Definition 9 (Weakly Robust PAC-Learning) Let Π = (X,C,Gen, Samp) be a learning task. We
say that Π is weakly robustly (ǫ, δ, γ, η)-PAC-learnable, if there exist PPT algorithmsL and C such
that
1. (L,C) is a (ǫ, δ)-PAC learner for Π
2. It holds for every PPT adversaryA (with oracle access to Ch) and all b ∈ {0, 1} that
|Pr[Ch(SampK(b)) = b]− Pr[Ch(A
Ch(·)(Sampst(1− b))) = b]| > γ,
except with probability η over the choice of st← Gen(1λ) and h ← LSampst(·).
We will typically require η to be negligible, and then omit mentioning it. Condition 2 in Definition 9
essentially requires that a weakly robust classifier Ch distinguishes adversarial examples from well-
formed samples with advantage γ. Conversely, an adversary A fools a classifier Ch if adversarial
examples for class 1− b producesd byA are indistinguishable from well formed samples of class b
for Ch .
C.2 Simplified Learning
We will now consider a setting of simplified learning, where the learning algorithm receives the
secret state st as input instead of getting access to samples of Sampst(·). As the name suggests, in
the simplified setting the task of the learning algorithm is made easier as it could now just simulate
a sample oracle Sampst(·). However, recall that our goal is to construct a learning problem Π for
which no small-size classifier can classify robustly in an adaptively chosen target metric. Thus, by
making the job of the learning algorithm easier this simplification will only strengthen our results.
We will now show a generic transformation which transforms a learning problemΠ in the simplified
setting into a PAC learnable problem Π′ while only slightly increasing the size of the samples x.
The idea is to append small shares of the secret state st to the samples. Given sufficiently many
shares, the learning algorithm can reconstruct the secret state st and use a learning algorithm in the
simplified model.
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Let Π be a classification task with generation algorithm Gen and sampler Samp. Assume that Gen
outputs a state st of size ℓ. Let F be a finite field of size 2λ, and t = ℓ/λ. Consider the following
problemΠ′, which has the same generation algorithm Gen but uses the following sampler ←$ ′.
Samp′st() : Run x ← Sampst(). Write st as s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ F
t. Choose a uniformly random
z ←$ F, compute γ ←
∑t
i=1 siz
i−1. Output x′ ← (x, z, γ).
First note that the samples x′ of Π′ are of size |x|+ 2λ and therefore small. We will now show that
Π′ is PAC-learnable, given that Π admits simplified learning.
Moreover, it follows immediately that any robust classifier for Π implies a robust classifier for Π′.
On the other hand, if Π is not robustly learnable, then neither is Π′.
Theorem 4 Assume that Π admits simplified robust learning. Then Π′ robustly PAC-learnable.
Proof 3 Let (L,C) be a pair of robust learners and classifiers for Π. We will construct (L′,C′) as
follows.
• L′: Query t samples (x′i, bi) of Π, where x
′
i = (xi, zi, γi). Interpolate a polynomial
f(X) =
∑t
i=1 s
′
iX
i−1 such that f(zi) = γi. Parse (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
t) = st. Compute and output
h ← L(st).
• C′
h
(x′): Parse x′ = (x, z, γ), compute and output b′ ← Ch(x).
We will now briefly argue that (L′,C′) is a pair of robust learner and classifier.
First note that the zi are all distinct, except with probability t · 2−λ, which is negligible. Conse-
quently, the (zi, γi) uniquely specify the polynomial f(X) =
∑t
i=1 siX
i−1 and it holds for all
i ∈ [t] that s′i = si.
The claim now follows as (L,C) are a pair of robust learner and classifier for Π.
C.3 Definition of the Learning Task
We will now provide a task which is not robustly learnable if the target metric is not known ahead of
time. We will start with a high-level description of the task. The problem is parametrized by a vector
of keys for a big-key encryption scheme. We will refer to these keys as feature keys. A sample of
this task consists of a vector of ciphertexts, each one encrypting the identifier of the class.
It follows straightforwardly that a single feature key is sufficient to classify this task non-robustly.
That is, the key ski allows to decrypt the ciphertext ci, yielding the class b. However, learning a
feature keys is costly as they are large in size, i.e. storing the key ski requires ℓ bits of storage.
Turning to robust classification, we will define our metrics in a way that allows the adversary to
manipulate exactly k out of the n features. More specifically, the metric is indexed by a set I ⊆ [n].
The adversary will be allowed to arbitrarily manipulate features with index in I , whereas all features
with index in [n]\I are protected, that is the adversary is not allowed to manipulate such features.
It is thus sufficient to have a single feature key with index outside of I and be aware of this fact
to classify robustly. Consequently, if the learning algorithm is aware of the target metric, there is a
simple robust classifier.
On the other hand, we will show that if the target metric can be chosen adaptively depending on the
classifier, then there is an attack which fools the classifier with high probability.
The idea of this attack is that the adversary will be able to learn which keys the classifier knows by
just having black box access to the classifier. Thus, the adversary can then choose the target metric
in such a way that none of the features for which the classifier knows the keys are protected.
Definition 10 Let PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a big-key encryption scheme and let n, ℓ be in-
tegers and λ be a security parameter. The problem Πn,ℓ is defined by the following algorithms
(Gen, Samp).
• Gen(1λ): For i = 1, . . . , n generate keys (pki, ski) ← KeyGen(1
λ, ℓ) and output a state
st← ((pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn)).
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• Sampst(b ∈ {0, 1}): For i = 1, . . . , n compute ci ← Enc(pki, b). Output feature vector
(c1, . . . , cn).
C.4 A strongly robust small-size classifier in one target metric
We will first provide a learning algorithm L and a classifier C which robustly classifies problem
Πn, ℓ in a given target metric ∆T which is explicitly provided to the learning algorithm via T. The
learning algorithm L is provided in the simplified model in which it receives the private state st
generated by Gen as input. In this construction, the model will have size ℓ + poly(λ) and thus be
small.
Learning AlgorithmL(T, st) :
• Parse st← ((pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn))
• Fix an index i∗ ∈ T
• Set h ← (i∗, ski∗) and output h.
Classifier Ch(x) :
• Parse h = (i∗, ski∗ , ci∗)
• Parse x = (c1, . . . , cn)
• Compute and output b← Dec(ski∗)
First note that the model h is of size ℓ+ log(n) and is therefore small.
We will briefly argue that (L,C) robustly classifies Πn,ℓ. First assume that x = (c1, . . . , cn) is a
sample ofΠn,ℓ generated by Sampst(b). Then each ci is of the form ci = Enc(pki, b). Consequently,
ci∗ = Enc(pki∗ , b) and by correctness of PKE it follows that Dec(ski∗ , ci∗) = b and we get that
Ch(x) outputs the correct class b.
Now let x˜ be an adversarial example such that ∆T(x, x˜) < 1. Write x˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜n). Recall that
the features with index i ∈ T are protected, that is if ∆T(x, x˜) < 1 it must hold for all i ∈ T that
c˜i = ci. But since the index i
∗ is chosen such that i∗ ∈ T, it holds that c˜i∗ = ci∗ . Consequently,
by the correctness of PKE we again get that Dec(ski∗ , ci∗) = b and we get that Ch(x) outputs the
correct class b.
Thus, we conclude that Ch robustly classifies Π in the target-metric∆T.
C.5 A strongly robust large-size classifier any supported metric
We will now show that there exists a learning algorithm and a large-size classifier for the problem
Πn,ℓ which is robust in any supported metric ∆T. This demonstrates that robust classification of
Πn,ℓ for an after-the-fact chosen metric is well-defined. That is, choosing the metric after the fact
does not make it impossible to classify robustly, but this comes at the cost of a large description size
of the classifier.
Our learning algorithm is again provided in the simplified model. Our learning algorithm and clas-
sifier follow the naive strategy: The learning algorithm learns the keys for all features whereas the
classifier decrypts all features and recovers the class b by making a majority decision.
Learning AlgorithmL′(st) :
• Parse st← ((pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn))
• Set h ← (sk1, . . . , skn) and output h.
Classifier C′
h
(x) :
• Parse h = (sk1, . . . , skn)
• Parse x = (c1, . . . , cn)
• For all i ∈ [n] compute bi ← Dec(ski, ci)
• Set b to be the majority of the bi, i.e. if
∑n
i=1 bi > n/2 set b = 1, otherwise b = 0.
• Output b
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Note that the model h is of size n · ℓ and therefore large.
We will now argue that C′
h
robustly classifies Πn,ℓ in any metric ∆T for which |T| > n/2. Thus fix
a T with |T| > n/2. Let x = (c1, . . . , cn) be a sample for class b ∈ {0, 1} and let x˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜n)
be an adversarial example with ∆T(x, x˜) < 1. By the definition of ∆T, it holds for all i ∈ T that
c˜i = ci. Consequently, it holds for all i ∈ T that bi = Dec(ski, c˜i) = b. However, since |T| > n/2,
it holds that the majority of all bi is b. Consequently,C
′
h
(x˜) outputs the correct class b. We conclude
that C′
h
robustly classifies Π any after-the fact chosen admissible metric∆T.
C.6 Impossibility of weakly robust Learning for adaptively chosen Metric
We will now provide an efficient perturbation adversaryA which fools any size-bounded classifier
for Πn,ℓ in an adaptively chosen target metric ∆T. The idea of this adversary is that A can detect
which keys the classifier Ch knows by testing whether C notices modifications in these indices.
Theorem 5 Assume that (L,C) is a pair of learner and classifier for problem Πn,ℓ such that L
produces models h of size at most n/2 · ℓ. Let ǫ > 0 and assume that AdvΠn,ℓ(Ch) ≥
1
2 + ǫ,
except with probability δ over the choice of h. Then for any γ > 0 there exists a PPT perturbation
adversaryA such that
|Pr[Ch(SampK(b)) = b]− Pr[Ch(A
Ch(·)(Sampst(1− b))) = b]| < γ,
where the runtime ofA is poly(λ, 1/γ ). In other words, Πn,ℓ is not weakly robustly learnable with
models of size at most n/2 · ℓ.
The following proof uses ideas relating to distinguisher dependent simulation as in [17, 18].
Proof 4 For a subset J ⊆ [n], denote byDJ the following hybrid distribution.
Distribution DJ(b) :
• For i ∈ [n]\J compute ci ← Enc(pki, b)
• For i ∈ J compute ci ← Enc(pki, 1− b)
• Output (c1, . . . , cn).
That is, on [n]\J the ci are computed as in Π by encrypting b, but on J the ci encrypt the flipped bit
1− b.
For a binary random variableX ∈ {0, 1}, we will use the shorthand ”’Compute an approximation
of E[X ] with error δ of” for the following procedure:
• Generatem = λ/δ2 samples x1, . . . , xm ofX
• Compute and output µ˜← 1m
∑m
i=1 xi
By the Hoeffding inequality, it immediately follows that
Pr[|µ˜− E[X ]| > δ] ≤ 2 · e−2λ,
i.e. µ˜ infact approximates E[X ] with an error at most δ, except with negligible probability over the
random choices of the approximation procedure.
Now let δ > 0 be a parameter which we will set later. The perturbation adversary A is given as
follows, where A gets as input a sample x of class 1 − b and produces an adversarial example x˜
which fools Ch to misclassify x˜ as class b. The strategy ofA is to identify a set J ⊆ n for which Ch
does not know the corresponding feature keys ski.
AdversaryACh(·)(x, 1 − b) :
• Set J0 = ∅
• For j = 1, . . . , n:
– Compute and approximation µ˜ of Ch(DJ(1− b)) with error δ.
– Compute and approximation µ˜′ of Ch(DJ∪{i}(1− b)) with error δ.
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– If |µ˜′ − µ˜| < 3δ set Jj ← Jj−1 ∪ {j} otherwise Jj = Jj−1
• If |Jn| < n/2 output⊥.
• Let x = (c1, . . . , cn).
• For all i ∈ [n]\Jn set c˜i ← ci
• For all i ∈ Jn set c˜i ← Enc(pki, b)
• Output x˜← (c˜1, . . . , c˜n) and set the target metric to ∆T, where T← J .
Let x be a sample of class b and let (x˜,T) ← ACh(·)(x). First note that conditioned that A does
not output ⊥ it holds that |J | < n/2, and thus in the metric ∆T it holds that ∆T(x, x˜) < 1 by the
way T is chosen.
Let x ←$ Sampst(1 − b) and x˜ ← A
Ch(·)(x, 1 − b). Moreover let x′ ←$ Sampst(1 − b). We will
now establish that
|Pr[Ch(x
′) = b]− Pr[Ch(x˜) = b]| < n · δ + negl(λ) .
Since we can choose the parameter δ arbitrarily small at the expense of increasing the runtime of
A, choosing δ < γ/n and the claim of the theorem follows.
Now fix a model h and consider the following hybrid experiments.
• H0: This is the real experiment, i.e. in this experiment we compute Ch(D∅(b)).
• Hi:
– Set J0 = ∅
– For j = 1, . . . , i:
∗ Compute and approximation µ˜ of Ch(DJ(b)) with error δ.
∗ Compute and approximation µ˜′ of Ch(DJ∪{i}(b)) with error δ.
∗ If |µ˜′ − µ˜| < 3δ set Jj ← Jj−1 ∪ {j}, otherwise Jj = Jj−1.
– Compute and output b′ ← Ch(DJ (b))
• Hn+1: Same asHn, but if |Ji| < n/2 output⊥.
First notice that in Hn+1, the output bit b
′ is identically distributed as that of Ch(A
Ch(x, 1 − b)).
We will now establish that
|Pr[H0 = 1]− Pr[Hn+1 = 1]| < n · δ + negl(λ) ,
which establishes that
|Pr[Ch(Sampst(b)) = b]− Pr[Ch(A(Sampst(1− b), 1− b)) = b]| < n · δ + negl(λ) .
We will first show that for all i ∈ [n] it holds that |Pr[Ch(Hi = b)] − Pr[Ch(Hi−1) = b]| <
δ + negl(λ).
Fix an index i and fix the set Ji−1 computed in the first i− 1 iterations of the loop in Hi. Let µ and
µ′ be the two approximations computed in the i-th iteration of the loop. We will distinguish 2 cases.
1. It holds that |µ′ − µ| ≤ 3δ
2. It holds that |µ′ − µ| > 3δ
Recall that µ′ is an approximation ofE[Ch(DJi−1∪{i}(b))] = Pr[Ch(DJi−1∪{i}(b)) = 1] with error
δ and µ is an approximation of E[Ch(DJi−1(b))] = Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1] with error delta. In the
first case, we can conclude that
|Pr[Ch(DJi(b)) = 1]− Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1]| ≤ |µ
′ − µ|+ 2δ < 5δ.
As in this caseHi computes Ch(DJi(b)) andHi−1 computes Ch(DJi−1(b)), it follows that
|Pr[Hi+1 = 1]− Pr[Hi = 1]| = |Pr[Ch(DJi(b)) = 1]− Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1]| < 5δ.
In the second case, the index i will not be included in the set Ji and thus Ji = Ji−1. Consequently,
in this case it holds that Pr[Hi+1 = 1] = Pr[Hi = 1]. Note that in this case it holds that
|Pr[Ch(DJi(b)) = 1]− Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1]| ≥ |µ
′ − µ| − 2δ ≥ δ.
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It remains to show that |Pr[Hn = 1]− Pr[Hn+1]| ≤ negl(λ).
First note that to simulate eitherHn orHn+1 we only need the public keys pki and in particular not
the large private keys ski.
First notice that by the way we constructed the set T = Jn it holds for all i ∈ [n]\T that
|Pr[Ch(DJi−1∪{i}(b)) = 1]− Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1]| ≥ |µ
′ − µ| − 2δ ≥ δ.
Noting thatDJi−1∪{i}(b) andDJi−1 only differ in the i-th feature, we can use Ch to construct a dis-
tinguisherDi which distinguishes encryptions of 0 from encryptions of 1 under pki with advantage
δ as follows.
Distinguisher Di(c
∗) :
• For all j ∈ Ji−1 compute cj ← Enc(pkj , 1− b)
• For all j ∈ [n]\(Ji−1 ∪ {i}) compute cj ← Enc(pkj , b).
• Set ci ← c∗.
• Set x′ ← (c1, . . . , cn).
• Compute and output b′ ← Ch(x′)
Clearly, if c∗ is an encryption of b, then the sample x′ constructed by Di is a sample of DJi−1 . On
the other hand, if c∗ is an encryption of 1 − b, then the sample x′ constructed by Di is a sample of
DJi−1∪{i}. It follows that
Adv(Di) = |Pr[Ch(DJi−1∪{i}(b)) = 1]− Pr[Ch(DJi−1(b)) = 1]| ≥ δ.
Consequently, by the key-knowledge security of PKEwe have an extractor E such that E(Di, st, δ) =
ski, except with probability δ over the choice of st.
Consequently, using the extractors E(Di, st, δ) we can extract all ski for i ∈ [n]\Jn. I.e. we can
extract the string (ski)i∈[n]\Jn from st. Noting that st is a string of size at most n/2 · ℓ− λ and all
ski are uniformly random bit strings of length ℓ, this implies that |Jn| > n/2 by Shannon’s source
coding theorem (as uniformly random strings cannot be compressed).
Thus, we have that |Jn| > n/2, except with negligible probability, which means that |Pr[Hn =
1]− Pr[Hn+1]| ≤ negl(λ).
This concludes the proof.
24
